Standards of Media Coverage of Elections in Ukraine by Orlova, Dariya
 Daria Orlova1 
Standards of Media Coverage of Elections in Ukraine 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................97 
2. Independence of Media Coverage 
in the Period of 1991-2008............................................................................98 
3. Independence of Media Coverage 
during the Presidential Election Campaign of 2009-2010 .............................99 
4. Conclusions ................................................................................................102 
Literature.........................................................................................................103 
Keywords: electoral coverage, standards of journalism, paid-for coverage, me-
dia in transition, political communication 
Abstract 
The paper explores the standards of media coverage of elections in Ukraine, 
focusing primarily on the news TV programs. While providing a brief overview of 
the practices of electoral coverage by Ukrainian media throughout last decade, 
the paper specifically addresses the most recent presidential election campaign 
of 2009-2010 as a case study. The paper presents the results of news monitor-
ing, outlining major trends in media coverage of election campaigns in Ukraine. 
The problem of paid-for coverage and its implications for the development of 
media system in Ukraine are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of electoral coverage by mass media is widely addressed by media 
and communication scholars, both in terms of conceptualisations and empirical 
research. This is largely explained by the fact that that the mass media are 
viewed as important actors in the political life of societies and contribute to 
shaping public perceptions. The function of informing is broadly associated with 
the capacity to influence public opinion. This particularly concerns the role of 
media at election time, when the media are primary sources for information on 
campaigns, both in established democracies and societies in transition.1 The 
electorate, as well as political actors, are highly dependent upon the election 
news coverage due to the flow of information.2 Therefore, informing is largely 
considered in relation to possible influence on electoral behaviour. And although 
scholarship is still divided on the questions about the nature and effect of politi-
cal information disseminated by media, few would dispute that unbiased elec-
tion coverage is a prerequisite for fair and honest elections. Both scholars and 
practitioners are concerned with biased coverage of election campaigns be-
cause such practices undermine traditional functions of mass media in society. 
Given that, analysis of election coverage by media has implications not only for 
the study of the media system of a country, but of the entire political system. 
Since media are at present a mainstream arena for political communication, elec-
tion campaigns are a time when political communication reaches extraordinary 
levels. As political leaders and organisations try to influence voters to affiliate with 
their positions, it is media that have to provide balanced information to the audi-
ence. Thus, the way the media respond to political communication of competing 
actors has implications for the whole society, as well as political system. 
In this respect, analysis of standards of electoral coverage by Ukrainian media 
reveals trends in the development of media system in Ukraine, on the one hand, 
and peculiarities of the country’s transformation towards democracy, on the 
other hand. This is also important in the context of the topic of public broadcast-
ing, because the whole essence of the public broadcasting concept is to provide 
the way for independent and unbiased media coverage. If Ukrainian media have 
a poor experience of unbiased coverage of elections, the introduction of public 
broadcasting service is likely to be affected by the embedded practices of bi-
ased journalism.  
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Such factors that define journalistic principles and standards such as honesty, 
independence of opinion, fair judgement, and news values1 are the basis for 
unbiased coverage of elections by media. They are also taken as criteria for 
analyzing journalists’ materials covering election campaigns. 
Below, the major peculiarities of Ukrainian media system in terms of independ-
ent coverage since the second half of the 1990s will be briefly outlined and then 
the findings of the news monitoring during the latest election campaign of 2009-
2010 will be discussed. 
2. Independence of Media Coverage 
in the Period of 1991-2008 
After Ukraine became independent in 1991, the country’s leadership declared 
the end of state censorship and confirmed the right to private ownership, which 
eventually led to the fast growing number of media, both press and broadcast-
ing companies.2 Within ten years the media system was predominantly privately 
held. However, it turned out that most private owners had very close links with 
political elites. This particularly concerned large television channels that re-
mained mainstream sources of information.3 DYCZOK 2009 notes that one of 
the notable trends of Ukrainian media system of that time was that many new 
media outlets were created for purposes of influence rather than to provide the 
public with information or generate profits. Media scholars and observers gen-
erally agree on that Ukraine’s political and economic elite quite effectively ma-
nipulated the mainstream mass media from the mid-1990s.4 In conditions of 
backsliding democracy, such imposed control over major media resulted in the 
biased coverage of political processes, events and actors, which evidently 
reached its height during election campaigns. 
Thus, during the 2002 Parliamentary election campaign, the mainstream media 
was clearly biased in favour of the so-called party of power, the pro-presidential 
bloc „For A United Ukraine“ („Za Yedynu Ukrayinu“), while either excluding op-
position parties or presenting them in a negative light.5 According to media ob-
servers, more than half the election coverage on television was devoted to the 
bloc „For A United Ukraine“, while the main opposition bloc „Our Ukraine“ re-
ceived only 13 % of the coverage, most of which was negative in tone.6  
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In 2004 the ruling elite strengthened their efforts to use media to win the presi-
dency, embarking on a multi-dimensional „Stop Yushchenko“ project that incor-
porated media aspect. According to DYCZOK 2009, media part of the campaign 
used at least three tactics:  
1) continued and expanded news cencorship, including denying Yushchenko 
access, 
2) discrediting Yushchenko in analytical and current affairs shows, 
3) the use and abuse of advertising. 
The ruling elite controlled the majority of key media either directly via temnyky, 
instructions to newsrooms on how to cover and present political news, or indi-
rectly through loyal media owners and top-managers.1 However, the Orange 
Revolution and subsequent change of elite brought transformation of relations 
between political actors, media owners, media managers and journalists.2 The 
new ruling elite had lost control over privately owned media and many news-
rooms switched to more balanced news coverage. Yet, the 2006 parliamentary 
election campaign marked a shift towards paid-for coverage.3 Media owners and 
managers started practices of selling news program time to different political 
forces. The 2007 parliamentary election campaign reinforced such practices with 
media owners becoming major actors who negotiated „media plans“ of coverage 
with major political forces and their headquarters.4 At the same time, disappoint-
ment with the results of the Orange Revolution contributed to the growing loyalty 
of journalists to cash for coverage practices, media analysts noted.5  
3. Independence of Media Coverage 
during the Presidential Election Campaign of 2009-2010 
Similar trends were observed during the recent presidential election campaign 
of 2009-2010, as shown by the monitoring conducted under the project of the 
non-governmental organisation Internews Network „U-Media“ (Monitoring of 
compliance with journalism standards and increasing media literacy of Ukrain-
ian citizens) by Telekritika and Institute of Mass Information. The monitoring 
covered major news programs of the 8 leading TV channels, as well as four na-
tion-wide printed publications (see table 1). However, news programs on TV are 
of particular interest in terms of standards of electoral coverage because news 
programs are supposed to be the least biased and most balanced in terms of 
providing information.  
The monitoring showed that the practice of paid-for news was widely used by 
most leading TV channels during the 2009-2010 election campaign. Paid-for 
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news, also known in Ukraine as „dzhynsa“, implies distortion of neutrality of in-
formation, creation of an obviously positive or negative image through violation 
of such standards as credibility of the news, balance of opinion, journalists’ per-
sonal evaluation and judgment.1 In most cases journalist materials that had 
traits of paid-for news were represented by short pieces of news about election 
campaign events of candidates, like meetings with voters, press-conferences, 
electoral tour events, electoral promises and statements of candidates etc.2 
Some TV channels (Inter and ICTV) even made special sections in news pro-
grams to cover such campaign events.3 News of this kind generally presents lit-
tle or no news value at all. Moreover, the concept of balance is also violated be-
cause only one candidate’s statement is represented.  
Table 1: 
The Number of Materials with Violations of Standards  
as Evidence About Possible „Paid-for“ Status of the Materials,  
in Major News Programs of Nation-wide TV Channels,  
by Weeks of Election Campaign 
Week ICTV „In-
ter“ 
Novyi First  
National
„1+1“ „Ukrai-
na“ 
STB Channel 
5  
19. - 24.10.2009 7 3 7 7 4 1 2 0 
26. - 31.10.2009 12 4 6 5 8 3 3 4 
2. - 7.11.2009 15 6 4 7 9 5 6 1 
9. - 21.11.2009 Data absent due to technical reasons 
23. - 29.11.2009 17 18 9 7 9 8 5 0 
30.11. - 
5.12.2009 
28 27 13 11 13 14 5 0 
7. - 12.12.2009 33 26 14 15 11 9 7 3 
14. - 19.12.2009 29 30 18 17 6 9 9 2 
21. - 26.12.2009 30 32 21 19 18 9 10 7 
28.12.2009 - 
2.01.2010 Data absent due to technical reasons 
04. - 09.01.2010 20 21 10 8 7 12 - 10 
11. - 16.01.2010 26 27 21 19 17 12 10 - 
The number of 
materials 217 194 123 115 102 82 57 27 
Source: TELEKRYTYKA/INSTITUTE OF MASS INFORMATION 2009-2010,  
TELEKRYTYKA 2010 
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Graph 1:  
The Number of Materials, by Week 
Source: TELEKRYTYKA/INSTITUTE OF MASS INFORMATION 2009-2010,  
TELEKRYTYKA 2010 
The graph 1 shows the trend of largely growing number of paid-for news in the 
course of the election campaign. Graph 2 shows the distribution of biased con-
tent on different TV channels. 
Graph 2:  
The Number of Materials, by TV Channel 
Source: TELEKRYTYKA/INSTITUTE OF MASS INFORMATION 2009-2010,  
TELEKRYTYKA 2010 
Another finding of the monitoring concerns the lack of journalists’ critical ap-
proach to politicians. Sayings of politicians per se are considered sufficient for 
making news even when such sayings do not in fact make news.1 Journalists 
frequently used materials provided by politicians’ press-service, for instance, 
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video. As a result, they simply reiterated what this or that politician said without 
bothering to check the facts and other aspects of the story. All in all, covered 
topics were frequently not newsworthy. 
Media experts noted that 2009 election campaign marked a huge presence of 
paid-for news from competing candidates, thus contributing to the emergence of 
the so-called paid-for „pluralism“ in the news when different candidates can pay 
for presence in news.1 In private communication, journalists admitted that chan-
nels’ managers claimed that by providing coverage for cash to different candi-
dates they secure some sort of pluralism and balance.  
At the same time, the monitoring showed unequal access of candidates to the 
media (see graph 3). Most of the news pieces that had traits of paid-for news 
contributed to positive coverage of six main candidates (Tymoshenko, Yanuko-
vych, Lytvyn, Yushchenko, Tihipko and Yatseniuk). There were a few instances 
of materials that had traits of paid-for news concerning some other candidates, 
but the activities of only six candidates were covered on a daily basis. The mon-
itoring found a comparatively small number of examples of negative coverage 
among those news items that had traits of paid-for news. 
Graph 3: 
The Number of Materials, by Candidates 
Source: TELEKRYTYKA/INSTITUTE OF MASS INFORMATION 2009-2010,  
TELEKRYTYKA 2010 
4. Conclusions 
To sum up, the monitoring of TV news coverage of 2009-2010 election cam-
paign revealed the growing trend towards cash for coverage news. Most of the 
observed news programs contained short news stories about election campaign 
activities of multiple candidates, although predominantly about 6 candidates out 
of 18 officially registered. Media observers pointed out that media owners and 
top managers stirred up massive cash for coverage practices during election 
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campaign, while journalists remained largely loyal to such practices.1 The in-
formal claims of media managers that such approach provides for balance in 
news on election campaign demonstrates lack of understanding of journalist 
standards of covering elections. 
The results of the discussed monitoring, as well as observations of media cov-
erage of previous election campaigns, demonstrate that Ukraine’s mainstream 
media largely violate journalistic standards of honest, transparent and unbiased 
coverage of election process, which definitely has implications for the develop-
ment of Ukraine’s media system towards high standards of journalism and hin-
ders the overall democratisation process in Ukraine. 
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